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In 2007, the University of British
Columbia (UBC) unveiled a new licensing
strategy to promote developing world
access to its technologies [1]. UBC’s
‘‘Global Access License Principles’’ aim
to ensure that the university’s biotechnol-
ogy and environmental licensees develop
and market UBC-derived technologies for
global benefit. Shortly thereafter, UBC
licensed rights to commercialize a low-
cost, oral formulation of Amphotericin B
developed by Dr. Kishor M. Wasan. It
was the first technology licensed under the
new policy. In addition to its improved
ease of administration and reduced toxic-
ity when used as an antifungal agent, Dr.
Wasan’s oral Amphotericin B is also a
novel agent against leishmaniasis. In
return for rights to market the drug for
the treatment of blood-borne fungal infec-
tions in the developed world, iCo Thera-
peutics agreed to produce and sell at-cost
versions of the drug for treatment of
leishmaniasis in developing countries.
UBC’s innovative licensing strategy for
novel leishmaniasis treatment illustrates the
powerful role university licensing agree-
ments can play in expanding global
medicine access. However, most other
universities have yet to fully replicate the
University’s strategy in establishing a
global access pathway to bring their life-
saving technologies to patients. We present
here a case study describing current
discussions at the University of California
(UC) system on the adoption of global
access licensing (GAL) principles. Such
reform could promote developing-world
access to the breadth of future UC-
developed technologies, and motivate
change at peer institutions. Globally, the
recent expansion of Bayh-Dole–like legis-
lation—a United States law that enables
universities to exclusively license technolo-
gies derived from federally funded
research—highlights the additional impor-
tance of GAL principles for institutions in
the global South, notably in India and
South Africa. Bayh-Dole–style laws cur-
rently under consideration in those coun-
tries contain weak provisions for safeguard-
ing public access to publicly supported
medicines [2,3]. The continued expansion
of such laws to nations heavily engaged in
neglected disease research could have
profound impacts on access to the products
that result from their work [4].
Global Access Licensing
Humanitarian or global access licenses
have achieved striking effects. One widely
advocated iteration involves licensees vol-
untarily allowing generic production of the
final product for exclusive distribution in
low- and middle-income (LMI) countries.
This approach realizes economies of scale
and market competition by locating the
most efficient manufacturer and distribu-
tor. In 2001, Yale University and Bristol-
Myers Squibb agreed to that situation for
its widely used HIV drug stavudine (d4T,
Zerit), triggering a 96% price reduction of
the drug in South Africa. Simply by
permitting the manufacture and sale of
generic stavudine in South Africa, market
forces drove down the price of the small
molecule [5]. Importantly, Yale’s action
came at no cost to the university in terms
of licensing revenues. As much was
reiterated by Yale’s Dean of Public Health
Michael Merson after Yale disclaimed
stavudine royalties: ‘‘[t]his change was
made at Yale without any negative
consequences for the University—finan-
cial or otherwise’’ [6]. This case example
demonstrates the viability of utilizing
university technology transfer to accelerate
access to medicines.
Currently, other universities have
adopted similar licensing approaches to
varying effects including: the University of
British Columbia (as previously descri-
bed), Emory University, University of
Edinburgh, University of Oxford, Univer-
sity of Washington, the University Col-
lege of London, and Boston University
[7,8,9,10,11,12]. Example access strategies
enumerated in Emory’s Global Access
Principles include structuring diligence
obligations to facilitate developing-world
access to low-cost products and encourag-
ing licensees to sublicense or forego patent
protection in developing countries.
Ironically, in failing to modify their
licensing practices, most major research
universities have fallen behind their industry
licensing partners. Many pharmaceutical
and biotechnology companies acknowledge
sublicensing to generic producers as a
socially responsible and financially viable
method to supply medicines to low-margin
developing world markets. In its Global
Access Program, Gilead Sciences has part-
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panies to enable the production and
distribution of generic versions of its HIV
medication tenofovir (Viread) for 95 devel-
oping countries [13]. Eli Lilly granted a
sublicense for the manufacture of generic
versions of two antibiotics effective against
multidrug-resistant tuberculosis (MDR-TB)
by companies in South Africa, China, India,
and Russia [14]. GlaxoSmithKline (GSK)
granted licenses to a number of generic
companies for the manufacture and sale of
generic antiretrovirals (ARVs) across sub-
Saharan Africa, including most recently
abacavir (Ziagen), a therapy derived from
compounds first synthesized at the Univer-
sity of Minnesota [15]. In its corporate
responsibility report published in March
2009, GSK committed to placing over 800
grantedandpendingpatentsinapatentpool
to help others to develop potential medicines
for neglected diseases [16]. Alnylam Phar-
maceuticals followed suit in July 2009,
adding 1,500 patents to the GSK pool [17].
But because many other pharmaceutical
firms persist in using traditional licensing
techniques, universities like the UC are
uniquely positioned to leverage their
ownership rights and manage their intel-
lectual property so that patent, data
exclusivity, and other legal barriers do
not unnecessarily prevent generic manu-
facturers from supplying much-needed
drugs to impoverished countries at the
lowest possible cost.
Universities Allied for Essential
Medicines
To maintain this pressure, the interna-
tional student-run organization, Universities
Allied for Essential Medicines (UAEM;
http://www.uaem.org), promotes access to
drugs that flow from publicly financed
research. UAEM recognizes developed-
world patents as important drivers of
innovation, provided that universities en-
gage in responsible intellectual property
management that consciously furthers glob-
al-access objectives. In 2008, UAEM mem-
bers successfully included this clause in the
Democratic National platform: ‘‘We also
support the adoption of humanitarian
licensing policies that ensure medications
developed with the U.S. taxpayer dollars are
available off patent in developing countries’’
[18]. For his 2008 Yale Law School Alumni
Address, Former President Bill Clinton
further stated that ‘‘universities ought to
take the lead in…[using] their discoveries
under conditions that will guarantee afford-
able medicines that save millions of lives.’’
In December 2008, in consultation with
academic experts and technology transfer
officers, UAEM released a Framework to
inform the development of institutional
access policies (see Box 1). Though
concern persists among university admin-
istrators that pharmaceutical sales (and
university royalties) might be negatively
impacted by a GAL, economic realities
and market segmentation suggest that it
would not diminish revenue streams. A
GAL would only guide licensing in LMI
countries in which major pharmaceutical
companies revenues and profits are scarce.
According to industry reports, consumers
in the US, Canada, the European Union,
and Japan contribute to 93.2% of all
pharmaceutical revenues [19].
While countries where a GAL would
facilitate access have few consumers, they
containtheworld’svastmajorityofpatients.
Ninety percent of the world’s poor live in
Africa, China, and India, but together
constitute just over 1% of the global
branded pharmaceutical market [16]. Indi-
vidual patients, as well as the governments
and nongovernmental organizations that
often purchase medicines on their behalf,
here are simply too resource-limited to
afford brand-name treatment and instead
rely on low-cost generic medicines. Mo-
zambique, for instance, is home to at least
1,500,000 HIV-positive persons, yet per
capita gross national income is $320
[20,21]. Despite poverty reduction efforts,
Mozambicans are not likely to become
consumers of full-priced drugs, vaccines, or
diagnostics in the near or medium term.
Indeeditisdoubtfulwhetherpovertycanbe
overcome without access to improved
health care [22]. The only revenue that
could come from treating these persons
with pharmaceuticals will originate in
funding agencies—the Global Fund, UNI-
TAID,PEPFAR,GAVI,UNICEF—whose
impact depends largely upon their ability to
negotiate at- or low-cost prices.
Spotlight on the University of
California
The adoption of GAL licensing terms
maybe nowheremorerelevant than atUC,
a public institution reaping nearly 10% of
the US National Institutes of Health (NIH)
external research budget, making it the
largest recipient of NIH funding in the U.S.
Moreover, industry reports now show that,
of all institutions of higher education, the
UC system averaged the highest level of
licensing income annually from its research
discoveries in biotechnology from 1997 to
2003 [23]. This follows from the fact that
research laboratories of the university’s ten
campuses produce more biotech patents
than any other similar organization in
America, including the US government,
Genentech, and the University of Texas
[24]. In fact, from 2002 to 2006, UC was
second worldwide only to the Japan
Science and Technology Agency in num-
ber of biotechnology patents. Key UC
discoveries include the hepatitis B vaccine;
Fuzeon, a salvage HIV therapy; and a low-
cost synthetic method of producing artemi-
sinin for malaria.
To date, substantive global-access li-
censing practices similar to those of Emory
or UBC have yet to be drafted or
implemented across the UC system. One
objection relates to infeasibility of therapy
scale-ups, and fear of driving drug resis-
tance through poor adherence. Another is
economic, and dwells on risks of pharma-
ceutical arbitrage and reimportation of
generic products to developed markets. To
the first point, though nonadherence and
the development of drug resistance are
Box 1. The Global Access License (GAL) Framework
Universities should implement Global Access Policies that adhere to the following
five principles:
1. Access to medicines and health-related technologies for all is the primary
purpose of technology transfer of health-related innovations.
2. Technology transfer should protect access to the final end product needed by
patients (e.g., formulated pills or vaccines).
3. Generic provision is the best way to ensure access to medicines in resource-
limited countries. Legal barriers to generic production of these products for use
in resource-limited countries should therefore be removed.
4. Proactive licensing provisions are essential to ensure that follow-on patents and
data exclusivity cannot be used to block generic production.
5. University licensing should be systematic in its approach, sufficiently
transparent to verify its effectiveness, and based on explicit metrics that
measure the success of technology transfer by its impact on access and
continued innovation.
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around the world indicates that patients in
the developing world achieve rates of
adherence (for both TB and HIV therapy)
superior to patients in the most developed
of settings [25,26]. Concerns over poor-
quality drugs, compliance with incorrect
regimens, and transmission of drug-resis-
tant disease strains are of concern in
decisions to increase drug distribution, but
are currently being addressed and moni-
toredbyleadingpublichealthofficialsatthe
World Health Organization (see http://
www.who.int/medicines/areas/rational_
use/en/ for more). To the second point,
while pharmaceutical arbitrage certainly
l o o m sa sat h r e a t ,i tr e m a i n sam o s t l y
theoretical and rarely empirically ob-
served phenomenon [27]. Conventions
adopted by the World Trade Organiza-
tionallowforuniquepill shape,color, and
packaging to distinguish generic formula-
tions from brand-name pharmaceuticals
[28,29]. Moreover, international mecha-
nisms of legal recourse exist for those
individuals and firms who break the
law. Finally, Gilead’s own practices dem-
onstrate the rationality of generic sub-
licensing for some products, as existing
manufacturing capacity likely cannot
meet the vast, low-margin demand ac-
companying scale-up of essential medi-
cines in the developing world.
At the same time, negotiations and
lobbying with UC continue; in June
2009, UC established a subcommittee to
consider global-access principles. To date,
however, no timeline or deliverables are
defined or slated. Given its immense
research output as well as its history of
promoting access to their discoveries with
industry, we believe that the UC system
can lead its peer institutions in adopting
GAL principles (see Box 2).
Global Access Licensing at All
Universities
Ultimately, we envision universal adop-
tion of Global Access Licensing via the
GAL Framework by all research institu-
tions, so that these concepts inform all
relevant licenses. UAEM is sensitive to the
fact that licenses are complex and each
will be unique. Its Framework does not
prescribe specific language; rather, its five
principles can guide university-specific
policy. We believe that these changes are
so fundamental to global health that their
implementation cannot wait.
There are signs of progress. On Novem-
ber 9th, 2009 six universities (Harvard,
Yale, Boston University, Oregon Health
Sciences University, the University of
Pennsylvania and Brown) along with the
Association of University Technology
Managers (AUTM) announced a plan to
facilitate access to university innovations
with a clause ensuring global access to low-
cost products by manufacturers for infec-
tious diseases [30,31,32]. To date, the NIH,
the Centers for Disease Control, and a
private manufacturer (Najit Technologies)
have also signed. Many publicly funded
universities and research institutes, includ-
ing the University of California, have not.
Working for the public good and with
its resources, a university’s most important
contract with the public is the social one:
to disseminate the knowledge and the
innovation they yield. In times of econom-
ic difficulty, it becomes all the more critical
that public funds are used maximally for
the public good. In a 2006 report to
Congress, the President’s Emergency Plan
for AIDS Relief (PEPFAR) reported that:
…in every case generics prices pre-
sent an opportunity for cost savings;
in some cases, the branded price per
pack of a drug is up to 11 times the
cost of the generic version…Every
dollar that can be saved can be used
to support additional prevention,
care and treatment services. [33]
Future successes of international human-
itarian programs, such as PEPFAR, may
well hinge on current decisions being made
regarding the patenting and licensing
policies of publicly funded university re-
search. The NIH has recently taken the
lead in requiring that publications that
follow from research sponsored by them be
made publicly available by no later than 12
months after the date of publication to the
National Library of Medicine’s free-access
digital archive, PubMed Central [34]; is
there any reason whyan analogous effort to
broadly mandate Global Access Licensing
should not now be pursued? To that end,
like-minded scientists, students, and policy
makers are urged to contact our campaign
to see Global Access Licensing executed for
allpubliclyfundedresearchfromCalifornia
to Cameroon.
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